Antitrust lawyers for companies blocked from competing by a dominant firm and for dominant firms whose success is being recast as monopolization.
These cases are at the core of our litigation practice. We won a published Tenth Circuit decision reinstating monopolization claims against a defendant that controlled nearly 100% of its market. We secured a $24 million settlement, plus injunctive relief, for a software company shut out by a rival controlling roughly 99% of the utility-management software market. We represent former online retailer Zulily in a monopolization case against Amazon in which the core claims survived the motion to dismiss. And we won a Ninth Circuit decision preserving group-boycott claims for a company excluded from its market by industry gatekeepers. We also regularly write about monopolization and exclusionary conduct on The Antitrust Attorney Blog, which is read by in-house counsel and enforcers worldwide.
Why Bona Law for Monopolization and Exclusionary Conduct
- The whole firm is the team. With more than 15 antitrust attorneys, we have a deeper bench than most people expect from a boutique and a more experienced antitrust group than most Biglaw firms. Monopolization cases draw on everything we do — litigators, appellate specialists, former federal and state enforcers, and attorneys with decades of in-house experience at dominant companies who know how these decisions actually get made.
- Published appellate wins in this exact doctrine. Monopolization cases are frequently decided on dispositive motions and appeals; our published Tenth and Ninth Circuit wins are in precisely this area of law.
- Fee structures built for the fight. Contingency and hybrid arrangements for the right case, experience working with litigation funders, and boutique economics without BigLaw overhead.
- Co-counsel friendly. Trial firms and industry counsel regularly bring us in as the antitrust specialist, including when a commercial case draws an antitrust counterclaim, or when their client has an offensive monopolization claim worth pursuing. Learn more about antitrust co-counsel.
- We wrote the resource your general counsel is already reading. The Antitrust Attorney Blog's monopolization and exclusionary-conduct libraries have been answering these questions for over a decade.
Representative Experience
Monopolization and exclusionary conduct
- Chase Manufacturing (Thermal Pipe Shields) v. Johns Manville Corp. (D. Colo.; 10th Cir.). Section 2 monopolization in the calcium-silicate mechanical-insulation market, against a defendant supplying nearly 100% of the market that allegedly threatened customers who bought from a new entrant. Bona Law won a published Tenth Circuit reversal reinstating the antitrust claims (with the U.S. Department of Justice participating as amicus) and the client ultimately prevailed on the merits. The case originally paired Section 2 claims with Lanham Act false-advertising claims over the defendant's product disparagement.
- Lucasys, Inc. v. PowerPlan, Inc. (N.D. Ga.). Section 2 case for a software competitor against a defendant controlling roughly 99% of the utility-management software market. After four-plus years of litigation, the case resolved in a $24 million settlement plus injunctive relief protecting our client’s access to customers.
- Zulily LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc. (W.D. Wash.). Representing former online retailer Zulily in a Section 2 monopolization action against Amazon alleging anti-discounting practices and anticompetitive agreements that suppressed retail price competition. The core monopolization and anti-discounting claims survived Amazon's motion to dismiss.
- PharmacyChecker.com v. LegitScript, NABP, et al. (S.D.N.Y.; D. Or.; 9th Cir.). Group-boycott action for a company excluded from the online-pharmacy verification and price-comparison markets. Won a published Ninth Circuit decision allowing the claims to proceed and later defeated the defendant's RICO and Lanham Act counterclaims.
- Antitrust counterclaims against T-Mobile (C.D. Cal.). Represented client in monopsonization counterclaims
- Crownalytics, LLC v. SPINS, LLC (D. Colo.). Prior representation of a data-analytics firm asserting Section 1 group-boycott and tying claims and Section 2 refusal-to-deal claims against retail-data rivals; the court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss.
- Group-boycott action for a Tony Award-winning theatrical producer (2d Cir.). Pressed Sherman Act claims that a coordinated refusal to deal fell outside the statutory labor exemption, through the Second Circuit and a cert petition to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Monopolies created or protected by government
- AmeriCare MedServices v. City of Anaheim, et al. (C.D. Cal.; 9th Cir.; U.S. Supreme Court cert petition). Twelve federal antitrust actions against Orange County municipalities for monopolizing emergency and non-emergency ambulance markets — the foundation of the firm's leading practice on the market-participant exception to state-action immunity.
- Western Star Hospital Authority (Metro Health) v. City of Richmond (E.D. Va.; 4th Cir.). Section 2 monopolization action challenging a city's grant of an exclusive ambulance franchise.
Amicus work on Section 2 doctrine
- FTC v. Qualcomm (9th Cir.). Amicus representation of the International Center for Law & Economics and leading law-and-economics scholars supporting Qualcomm — addressing exclusionary-conduct doctrine in one of the defining Section 2 appeals of the era.
Counseling and risk assessment (clients confidential)
- Post-acquisition Section 2 and vertical-foreclosure counseling for a cryptocurrency infrastructure operator whose new subsidiary supplied a competitor.
- Counseling a U.S. cable company on exclusion from an industry organization controlling a critical sales channel — group-boycott, essential-facilities, and trade-association theories.
- Amazon marketplace counseling for sellers and brands on pricing-policy enforcement, distribution, and platform conduct.
- Representation of a client in a Section 1 and Section 2 matter involving critical internet infrastructure, before the DOJ and state attorneys general.
- Antitrust claim-strength and risk assessment for litigation finance companies evaluating potential monopolization claims.
If a Dominant Company Is Blocking You from Competing
The hardest step in most monopolization cases is the first one: recognizing that what feels like aggressive-but-normal business may be a federal antitrust violation. We tell you if there is a sustainable case after evaluating the potential claim: the level of monopoly power in a properly defined market, the exclusionary character of the conduct, and the existence of antitrust injury and damages. If there is, we litigate it like it's headed to trial, because cases prepared that way not only try better — they tend to settle sooner. See Ten Ways to Tell Whether You Have an Antitrust Claim and Blocked from Competing in Your Market? You Are Not Alone.
One more reason not to wait: the federal antitrust statute of limitations is four years — which means the sooner we see your facts, the more of your damages period we likely can protect.
If You Are Accused of Monopolization
Success attracts Section 2 claims. Competitors recast vigorous competition as exclusion. Plaintiffs gerrymander markets until your share looks dominant. Government Section 2 enforcement invites follow-on civil suits. We defend monopolization and attempted-monopolization claims with the same tools we use to prosecute them — and we know from having sat in the plaintiff's and prosecutor's chairs exactly where these cases are weakest.
Relatedly, we often counsel companies with large market shares on how to compete aggressively while limiting Section 2 exposure. Our antitrust counseling and compliance practice focuses not only on how to avoid violating the antitrust laws, but also on how to avoid any appearance of impropriety that may invite a case and keep you in it longer than necessary. We represent clients in single-firm-conduct government investigations before they become complaints; and when exclusionary-conduct allegations arrive as class actions, our MDL defense team takes the laboring oar.
Antitrust Cases Against Big Tech Platforms
The signature monopolization cases of this era are platform cases, which have their own doctrinal toolkit — two-sided market definition after Amex, purchaser standing after Apple v. Pepper, the nascent-competitor theory revived by Phhhoto v. Meta, and the refusal-to-deal line from Trinko and linkLine — and the frontier is moving fast into artificial intelligence. Our attorneys' new series, Platforms, AI, and the Fight for Consumer Choice, examines how the courts, starting with the battle over AI assistants and defaults, will decide who owns the customer's first question. If a platform controls your access to customers and is using that control to exclude you, few firms have thought harder about your case. Learn more about our Telecommunications and Platforms industry practice.
The Conduct We Litigate
Clients rarely arrive saying “we have a Section 2 problem.” They describe their circumstances and rely on us to identify the relevant law:
- Refusals to deal and supplier cutoffs. A dominant supplier stops selling to you — or threatens your customers for buying from you. See Does a Refusal to Deal with a Competitor Create Antitrust Liability? and My Supplier Just Decided to Stop Dealing with Me.
- Exclusive dealing, loyalty discounts, and conditional rebates. Contracts, rebates, or threats that lock up the customers, distributors, or inputs a rival needs. See Does an Exclusive-Dealing Agreement Violate the Antitrust Laws?, How Should the Antitrust Laws Analyze Loyalty Discounts and Bundled Rebates?, and our analysis of the DOJ's Bayer seed loyalty-program investigation.
- Tying and bundled discounts. Conditioning the product you must have on products you don't want, or bundle pricing a single-product rival cannot match. See the elements of a per se illegal tying claim, negative tying agreements, and the discount-attribution test for bundled discounts.
- Predatory pricing. Below-cost pricing designed to eliminate competition now and recoup later. See Predatory Pricing: Rarely, But Not Never, Successful — and why venture-backed and foreign-funded companies could face these claims too.
- Monopsony and buyer-side power. A dominant buyer suppressing the prices or terms of those who must sell to it — an increasingly active frontier, from agricultural buyer power to labor markets. See When Is a Monopsony an Antitrust Violation?.
- Platform exclusion, self-preferencing, and nascent-competitor acquisitions. Marketplaces and ecosystems that punish discounting, demote rivals, or buy competitors before they become threats.
- Group boycotts and industry-organization exclusion. Rivals or gatekeepers acting together to deny you customers, suppliers, certification, or channel access. See Does the Group Boycott Violate the Antitrust Laws? Five Questions and My Competitors Are Conspiring Against Me.
- Restrictive contract terms with exclusionary effect. Most-favored-nation clauses, anti-steering rules, and other provisions dominant firms use to blunt competition. See What Do MFN Clauses Have to Do with Antitrust?.
- Attempted monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize. Section 2 liability doesn't wait for the monopoly to be complete.
- Monopolies created or protected by government. Exclusive franchises, licensing-board exclusion, and other government-conferred advantages. Bona Law has one of the nation's leading practices on the state-action immunity doctrine. See the Supreme Court's licensing-board decision in N.C. Dental and our Challenges to Anticompetitive and Unlawful Government Action practice.
Where These Cases Arise: Industry Experience
Exclusionary conduct looks different in every industry — and we have litigated, counseled, or written on it in most:
- Technology and platforms — platform self-preferencing, app-store and marketplace conduct, and antitrust exposure in AI product design.
- Construction and building materials — our Section 2 case against a manufacturer supplying nearly 100% of the calcium-silicate insulation market, including threats to cut off customers who bought from a new entrant.
- Energy and commodities trading — monopolization by an incumbent controlling ~99% of the utility-management software market, resolved for $24 million plus injunctive relief.
- Healthcare, pharmaceutical, and medical device — exclusive franchises, device-aftermarket claims, bundled rebates by dominant health systems, and certificate-of-need laws that protect incumbents.
- Blockchain and digital assets — refusal-to-deal, tying, and exclusion theories applied to dominant exchanges, custodians, and infrastructure providers — see our take on refusal to deal as exclusionary conduct in Web3.
- Real estate and housing — MLS and listing-platform exclusion, including our antitrust action involving a regional MLS used as a competitive weapon.
- Agriculture and food — input-market monopolization, processor buyer power, and the loyalty-program theories in the DOJ's Bayer investigation.
- Sports, entertainment, and beyond — league exclusion of upstart rivals and athletes' monopsony claims, from the NBA's rival-league problem to the MMA fighters' class certification win.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is it illegal to be a monopoly? No. The antitrust laws punish monopolizing, not monopoly. A company that wins its market through a better product or lower prices is legal; a company that maintains or extends dominance through exclusionary conduct — for example, cutting off rivals' supply, locking up distribution, or punishing customers who deal with competitors — may violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
What do we have to prove in a monopolization case? Monopoly power in a properly defined market, willful acquisition or maintenance of that power through exclusionary conduct, and antitrust injury — harm to competition itself, not just to a competitor. Our guide to the elements of a monopolization claim walks through each element.
My key supplier cut me off after I started dealing with its rival. Do I have a claim? Possibly. A dominant firm's refusal to supply is lawful in most circumstances but can violate Section 2 in the right ones — and recent appellate authority directs courts to weigh a monopolist's whole course of conduct rather than isolated acts. These are fact-intensive cases; the sooner we see yours, the more options you have.
Can we afford to sue a much larger company? The Clayton Act was written to encourage private enforcement: treble damages plus recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees for plaintiffs who prevail. For the right case we consider contingency and hybrid arrangements, and we have experience working with litigation funders. Ask us.
We just got accused of monopolization. What should we do first? Involve antitrust counsel immediately. Also, preserve documents and resist the urge to explain yourself to the other side — including government enforcers — until you have consulted counsel. Early missteps, especially in writing, are what plaintiffs build cases from.
Do these cases actually go to trial? Most resolve earlier — at the motion to dismiss, during discovery, or at summary judgment. But settlements track trial risk: our $24 million resolution with injunctive relief for a client in one case came after years of litigation positioned for trial. You can read more about this case here.
Fees: Contingency, Hybrid, and Litigation Funding
The question that decides most monopolization cases is asked before the complaint is filed: can we afford this fight? Our answer has three parts. First, for the right case, we consider contingency and hybrid fee arrangements — we have real skin-in-the-game experience on the plaintiff side, and aligning our fees with your recovery is often the structure that makes a strong claim viable. Second, we are willing to work with — and have experience working with — litigation funders: we understand how they evaluate antitrust claims, including liability theories, market definition, damages, and risk, and we can help position a meritorious case for funding on terms that preserve your control and your recovery. Third, the Clayton Act itself helps: prevailing plaintiffs recover treble damages plus reasonable attorneys' fees.
Monopolization and Exclusionary Conduct Resources
Selected guidance from The Antitrust Attorney Blog and Bona Law's resource library can be found below.
Monopolization fundamentals
- What Are the Elements for a Monopolization Claim under the Federal Antitrust Laws?
- What Is a Monopolization Claim? (Bona Law Legal Resources)
- Ten Ways to Tell Whether You Have an Antitrust Claim
- Blocked from Competing in Your Market? You Are Not Alone
- Antitrust Injury and Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat
Exclusionary-conduct theories
- Does a Refusal to Deal with a Competitor Create Antitrust Liability?
- My Supplier Just Decided to Stop Dealing with Me: Do the Federal Antitrust Laws Help Me?
- Does an Exclusive-Dealing Agreement Violate the Antitrust Laws?
- Do the Antitrust Laws Prohibit Tying Products or Services Together for Sale?
- Do Bundled Discounts Violate the Antitrust Laws? LePage's, PeaceHealth, and the Discount-Attribution Test
- Predatory Pricing: Rarely, But Not Never, Successful under US Antitrust Laws
- Unpacking Antitrust: When Is a Monopsony an Antitrust Violation?
- When Loyalty Programs Become Antitrust Problems: DOJ's Bayer Seed Investigation
- What the Fire Apparatus MDL Teaches Every Acquisition-Driven Company About Section 2 Risk
Big Tech and platforms
- Platforms, AI, and the Fight for Consumer Choice (series)
- Apple, AI, and the Fight to Control Consumer Choice — Part 1
- How Phhhoto v. Meta Turned the Nascent Competitor Theory into a Weapon Against Big Tech
- Beyond the DOJ Complaint: Potential Exclusionary Conduct Theories in the Apple Ecosystem
- Unpacking the Implications of the FTC's Antitrust Case Against Amazon
- Germany's Competition Authority Sanctions Amazon Over Its Control of Seller Pricing
- Classic Antitrust Cases: Trinko, linkLine and the House Report on Big Tech
- Antitrust Lawyers: AI's Wartime Consiglieres
Bringing — or defending — the case
- What Is the Statute of Limitations for a Federal Antitrust Claim?
- What Is the Twombly Motion-to-Dismiss Standard for Antitrust Cases?
- What Is Noerr-Pennington Immunity, and Is It a Defense to an Antitrust Case?
- DOJ Antitrust Division “Absolutely” Prepared to Criminally Charge Illegal Monopolization
- How Do I Know Whether My Company Is Abusing Its Dominant Position in the European Union?
Contact Us
Whether a dominant company is squeezing you out of your market or your own market position has drawn a Section 2 claim or investigation.